Capital accumulation has been one major issue in fishery economics over the last two decades, whereby the interaction of the fish and capital stocks were of particular interest. Because bio-economic systems are intrinsically complex, previous efforts in this field have relied on a variety of simplifying assumptions. The model presented in this paper has been substantially extended and avoids some of these simplifications. Problems of tractability are surmounted by using the methodology of qualitative differential equations (QDE) applied in dynamic bio-economic modeling for the first time. The theory of QDEs also takes into account that scientific knowledge about particular fisheries is usually limited. The model is able to trace the evolution of capital and fish stock in good agreement with observed patterns, and shows that overcapitalization is unavoidable in unregulated fisheries.
Introduction
Following sustained interest from policy makers, recent years have seen a number of bio-economic models examining the effects of commercial fishery on marine resources. The issue is important because more than 70% of the world's fish resources are currently assumed to be heavily exploited or overexploited [11] . Because approximately 20% of the global protein consumption relies on fishery products [9] , a precautionary use of fish resources is of vital interest for worldwide food security.
Even though overfishing has been a fact since historical times [16] , the problem has gained a new quality due to the 'industrialization' of commercial fishery. In this context, the impact of capital accumulation has been one issue in fishery economics over the last two decades [4, 7, 17, 24, 26] . In this contribution, commercial fishery is portrayed as a system in which the dynamics of a biological stock and a capital stock interact dynamically. As the capital stock is highly specialized and cannot readily be converted to other uses, investment decisions are characterized by irreversibility, which represents a major cause of overfishing.
The previous literature has treated capital accumulation in various settings. Clark, Clarke and Munro [7] , hereafter referred to as CCM, study the optimal management strategy for a renewable resource with irreversible investment, assuming that marginal investment costs are constant. The latter assumption is abandoned by Boyce [4] on the grounds that constant investment costscounterfactually -imply an immediate jump in the capital stock, which is then followed by a period of decline in both the capital and fish stock. Such a behavior does not accord with observed patterns of capital accumulation, which are characterized by an initial phase of continuous growth of fleet size. Assuming increasing marginal investment costs leads to better agreement with observations, but makes the model more complicated. Considerations of tractability therefore lead Boyce to assuming that -contrary to the CCM framework -harvesting productivity is independent of the size of the biological stock.
In contrast to these optimal-exploitation models, approaches which study capital accumulation in more realistic institutional environments are rare. An exception is McKelvey [24, 25] who examines an open-access fishery with irreversible investment under both perfect and imperfect competition. But the increased realism of these models comes at a cost in that marginal investment costs and harvesting productivity are kept constant in the analysis of out-of-equilibrium behavior due to serious analytical difficulties. In general, the variety of modeling strategies pursued in the literature thus reflects a tension between realism and tractability. A key characteristic of the bioeconomic systems under consideration is complexity in both biological and economic terms. Yet, in order to keep the models accessible to analysis, most of the models mentioned above disregard at least one of these difficulties, e.g. those relating to investment costs, harvesting productivity, or industry structure.
A possible approach to sail around the enigma of tractability problems might be seen in using numerical simulation models rather than analytical models. However, such an approach has limits of its own, in terms of the information it requires. In fact, as pointed out by Clark [6] , our understanding of bio-economic systems is characterized by low levels of knowledge. Both the dynamics of fish stocks and the economic characteristics and strategies of the fishing industry are subject to a serious lack of information [20, 31] .
In such a situation of uncertainty, the methodology of qualitative simulation [19] offers an alternative to both analytical modeling and numerical simulation. This technique allows the dynamic behavior of a system to be simulated qualitatively without the need for its exact functional and numerical specification. For an encompassing analysis it is not necessary to formulate precise numerical parameterizations, which is hardly possible in view of the problems discussed above. Rather, the approach allows all behaviors of the system to be characterized and classified on the basis of purely qualitative relationships. This technique, developed in the field of artifical intelligence, has not yet been used in bio-economics. This paper uses qualitative simulation to investigate the dynamics of capital accumulation in an open-access fishery with nonlinear investment costs and stock-dependent harvesting productivity. Our model is able to trace the evolution of capital and fish stocks in good agreement with observed patterns. The comprehensive qualitative simulation predicts that the capital stock continues to rise even after the harvest has started to decline, a fact which may have significantly contributed to the overexploitation of fish resources. The analysis of overcapitalization improves the understanding of mistakes made in resource management, and reveals critical branchings in the development of a fishery.
We have organized this paper as follows: In section 2 the general strategy of qualitative modeling is introduced and motivated by an example which is already related to the situation in marine fishery. Section 3 develops an analytical model of capital accumulation in fisheries. In section 4 we generalize this model to a qualitative model, present its solution, and use it to reconstruct the development of the blue whale industry. In section 5 we compare the results with some development paths recently observed in industrial fishery and draw general implications for fisheries management. A discussion and a summary concludes this paper.
Qualitative Modeling of Bio-Economic Systems
Strategies to avoid the analytical and methodological difficulties mentioned above are opened by smart qualitative techniques which are developed in artificial intelligence research and to an increasing extent applied for sustainability issues (e.g. [3, 13, 28] ). In particular, so-called qualitative differential equations [19] are a suitable tool for integrating weak and/or uncertain knowledge as it often occurs in bio-economic systems [8] .
Bio-economic systems are generally described by ordinary differential equations (ODE). Systems of ODEs may be difficult to solve because of incomplete knowledge of functional forms and parameters. Qualitative modeling proceeds by disregarding functional forms and parameters and considering a comprehensive class of ODEs defined only by certain qualitative properties. This so-called structural abstraction yields a qualitative differential equation (QDE). All solutions of ODEs which are consistent with the qualitative properties correspond to a solution of the QDE (see Fig.1 ). In this section, we illustrate this approach of qualitative modeling by means of a highly simplified fishery model. Relationships between ordinary (ODE) and qualitative differential equations (QDE). In a situation where only uncertain knowledge or insufficient data exist the reasoning process indicated by the dashed arrows is often unsuitable for model building. Therefore, the reasoning process follows along the solid arrows.
Consider a natural resource stock x with an associated recruitment function R(x). The exploitation of the stock (harvest) h only depends on x. Thus, the time behavior of the stock ('exploitation path') can be expressed as followsẋ
Additionally, it is assumed that h(0) = 0 holds, and h is strictly increasing in x. The regeneration function is of the typical Schaefer type [29] and attains a maximum M SY (maximum sustainable yield) at x MSY . Furthermore, R(0) = R(Q) = 0, where Q denotes the carrying capacity of the biological system. Further, for x < x MSY the function R is strictly increasing, but strictly decreasing if x > x MSY . A QDE model corresponding to Eq. (1) can be established by means of generalized monotonicity assumptions and so-called landmarks. For each variable a well-ordered set of landmarks is chosen defining its lower and upper bounds and some other crucial values, e.g. 
Since this qualitative values denote intervals for x, h and R respectively, they are unchanged for a initial time interval (t 0 , t 1 ), for which the endpoint remains to be determined. Note that the qualitative value for R is a consequence of the model assumptions introduced above. Seen qualitatively the assumptions constrain the behavior of the model and thus implicitly describe the qualitative states possible in the model. Such constraints can be either written as implications, or more compactly, as relations (cf. Fig. 2 ). In the relational form, for example, has to be transformed in order to satisfy some technical requirements.
Demonstrating how the dynamics of the model evolve (initiated by the states defined in Eq. (3)) possible changes (pathways of system development) in the qualitative state are investigated. In particular, three so-called qualitative events can occur, which now determine the time point t 1 : (i) x decreases below x MSY , where h still resides above M SY at this time point.
(ii) h decreases below M SY , while x stays above x MSY at this time.
(iii) x decreases below x MSY and h decreases below M SY at the same time.
During a simulation run the applied algorithm searches for all possible successors of a given state, as e.g. defined in Eq. (3). Successors are those qualitative states that are valid for a time interval beginning with a qualitative event.
Suppose, for example, the successor state after case (i). With respect to the defined constraints it is clear that the resource stock tardily decreases below x MSY and is further declining due to an unchanged harvest in the next time interval. It follows from the constraints (cf. Fig. 2 ) that R < R MSY and [Ṙ] = −. Thus, for the next time interval (t 1 , t 2 ) (where the endpoint t 2 once again is undetermined at this stage) one obtains the state
as successor state. Focusing on case (ii) one obtains
with similar arguments to those introduced above. Case (iii) can be neglected here, because it represents a very particular borderline case, which normally cannot be observed in a realistic environment.
In succeeding steps the algorithm seeks for further possible qualitative events that shift qualitative states to new states consistent with the applied constraints. Each possible sequence of such qualitative states is called a behavior. Thus, due to indeterminations of the definitions in the model the result of a simulation run is not a unique solution, because qualitative states can have more than one successor, i.e. at certain time points a branching might occur. A qualitative behavior is only terminated if an equilibrium is attained or if no possible successor exists. In addition, it is also feasible that a behavior forms a cycle. It should be emphasized here that a single behavior not only represents one development path (with real values), but a set of paths (in a quantitative approach this is synonymous with the solutions of a class of ODEs) consistent with the constraints (see, e.g. Fig. 4 To display the solution set in a concise and clearly arranged manner a state-transition-diagram can be drawn (see [18] ), representing the results of a qualitative simulation run in a graph theoretical sense (Fig. 5) . Such a diagram displays the overall dynamics of an investigated system and allows a system to be discussed under a perspective of general properties holding for all possible numerical and functional specifications of the qualitative model. The diagram consists of vertices (boxes) indicating the direction of change of the variables of interest, and edges (arrows) denoting qualitative events, i.e. possible changes of qualitative states. Circles represent equilibrium states. For the example introduced, three potential pathways designate how the qualitative model can behave if it is initialized by state #1 (Fig. 5 , see also Eq. (3)):
1. The harvest decreases below M SY , whereas the stock still resides above x MSY (state #2).
During the next step the stock and harvest become constant and the system approaches the equilibrium state #3.
2. First, the stock decreases below x MSY (state #4), then h passes the landmark M SY (state #5). Thereafter, an equilibrium is attained (state #6).
3. The 'disaster trajectory' of the system is characterized by not stabilizing at state #6, but moving via state #5 to state #7, where stock and harvest collapse.
Using this approach the bio-economic system can be investigated from a more systematic perspective, e.g. management issues or potential branching points. The possible dynamic behaviors of a generalized system are displayed by a common representation and general system properties can be identified. This provides a way to deal with uncertainty as well as to classify singular cases of resource exploitation [28] .
In the following section a more elaborated model is presented and embedded in recent research efforts in the field of bio-economics.
A Fishery Model with Capital Accumulation
The model describes a situation where N identical and profit maximizing firms compete for an open access resource, i.e. a marine fish stock with the size x. Because the harvesting technology and the associated cost and profit functions have been formulated in several ways in the previous literature [1, 4, 7, 24] , we start by deriving a generic, encompassing formulation based on standard production economics.
Presume that any harvesting requires variable inputs (labor, fuel, material), jointly referred to as effort e, and fixed inputs k (capital, e.g. ships and gear). The productivity of these inputs depends on the biological stock x. Thus a production function f (e, x, k) can be defined, that determines the resulting harvest h ≥ 0. For its partial derivatives 1 the properties f e , f x , f k > 0, f ee , f kk , f xx < 0, f ex , f ek , f xk > 0 are imposed. The first two sets of inequalities describe the standard properties of positive, decreasing marginal products. The third set of inequalities means in particular that the marginal product of the variable input decreases with decreasing fish stock, but is raised by capital accumulation. The derivative of harvest with respect to the fish stock also increases in capital, because certain attributes of capital enhance the accessibility of the fish stock (improved fishing gear and technology, increased horsepower of boats, etc.).
The variable cost function v(h, x, k) can be determined by solving h = f (e, x, k) for e and multiplying it with a renumeration rate w which is assumed to be fixed. Due to the assumptions made for f , the implicit function theorem implies that
v hx , v hk < 0.
It should be noted that the marginal harvesting costs v h decrease in both the fish stock and the capital stock. This assumption differs from previous approaches where capital only sets an upper limit for the harvest. In our model in which an increase in capital equipment improves the productivity of the variable inputs, capital accumulation may offset the negative effect on harvesting costs of a declining fish stock. We now turn to the dynamics of the economic and biological stock. The regeneration of the resource is given by a concave recruitment function R(x), for which the definitions made in section 2 are valid. We defineẋ
as equation of motion, where h denotes the harvest of a firm under consideration and h ′ that of all the others. Each firm's capital stock is described bẏ
where I ≥ 0 represents (irreversible) investment and δ the depreciation rate, which is assumed to be constant. Investment costs are expressed by a strictly convex increasing function c(I). The convexity reflects inelastic supply of highly specialized equipment and rising adjustment costs for higher investment. The demand for fish is described by the downward sloping inverted demand function p(h + h ′ ). In the following the decision of each firm on h and I has to be determined. If each fishing company acts in an economically rational way, it chooses an investment and harvest plan that maximizes the discounted profit given by
subject to Eq. (5) and Eq. (6). Here, r denotes a constant discount rate and J = [0, T ] a planning interval. This problem can be actually considered as a non-cooperative differential game, introducing the Nash assumption that each rival rests its own decisions on given levels of harvest and investment of the other participants in the fishery [24] . By a straightforward application of equivalent transformations on Eq. (5)-(7), the optimization problem can be solved by a theorem of Mangasarian [21] 2 . By introducing λ and µ as costate variables for x and k, the current-value Hamiltonian is given by
The last two terms appear due to the constraints I ≥ 0 and h ≥ 0. The Mangasarian theorem implies for an optimal solution that σ, ρ ≥ 0 and σh + ρI = 0 everywhere. Thus σ = ρ = 0, i.e. the constraints are not binding. In addition to the transversality conditions λ(T ) = µ(T ) = 0, it is sufficient for an optimum that the first-order conditions H h = H I = 0 and the costate conditions H x = rλ −λ and H k = rµ −μ are satisfied.
The model developed so far may be unrealistic, because firms are most likely to ignore the effect of their harvesting decision on future stocks [2, 14, 15] . In other words, they disregard Eq. (5) in their optimization procedure, partly because of a lack of knowledge on the recruitment function, and partly because they consider their own influence on the fish stock to be negligible. Moreover, they often obviously assume that other firms behave in the same way, too. We refer to this case as atomistic open access and suppose that the shadow price for the biological stock is neglected by the individual firms. From this perspective it is consistent to set λ ≡ 0 in the fourth summand of the current-value Hamiltonian Eq. (8). As a consequence, the costate condition for λ becomes irrelevant. Utilizing the (constant) inverse price elasticity of demand ǫ, one obtains the following conditions:
According to Eq. (10) the costate variable on capital equals the marginal cost of investment. If the latter were constant, as assumed in several previous models, Eq. (11) would therefore boil down to the usual condition that the user cost of capital, (r + δ)c I , should just be balanced by the induced reduction in variable costs, −v k . In our model with increasing marginal investment costs, we get a more complicated equation. By substituting µ from Eq. (10) and its time derivative in Eq. (11) one gets (r + δ)c I = −v k +ċ I , whereċ I = c IIİ . In this case, the investment program is characterized by the condition that the user cost of capital should be balanced not only by reduced variable costs, but also by the change in the purchase cost of capital induced by a change in the level of investment.
Because we have assumed that all firms are characterized by the same technology and behave in the same way, one obtains h + h ′ = N h. Furthermore, the total amounts of capital and investment are given by N · k and N · I, respectively. Our model can therefore be written in the following way:
Here Eq. (12) has already been interpreted above and Eq. (13) represents the usual equality between marginal variable costs and marginal revenue. It should be recalled that the marginal variable costs v h decrease in both the fish stock and the capital stock. Therefore, an increase in marginal costs due to a decreasing fish stock may trigger additional investment, in an effort to keep marginal costs from rising excessively. This will be crucial for explaining why the capital stock may increase along with a decrease in the fish stock, a phenomenon which is at the heart of what is frequently referred to as overcapitalization. This strategy may come to a limit because of the ensuing increase in marginal investment costs. These comments suggest that our model may in fact be able to trace crucial patterns of realworld fishery. In this context, a question of particular importance is whether there are chances that an intrinsic limit to overcapitalization may be reached at a stage early enough for the fish stock to recover. Unfortunately, the answer to this question as well as the general dynamics of our model crucially depends on the parameters of the recruitment function, the variable cost function, and the investment cost function. As stated in the introduction, the level of our knowledge regarding the course of these functions is rather low. However, if we would to proceed with the analytical reasoning one only yields equilibrium cases, which is not quite satisfactory, since bio-economic systems as introduced tend to stay far away from equilibrium. Moreover, the usual procedure of phase plane analysis becomes quite complicated if more than two differential equations are involved, as it is the case in our model.
To surmount these difficulties and to analyze the whole set of possible behaviors of the ODE system Eq. (12) - (15), the corresponding QDE is studied in the next section.
The Qualitative Model and its Solution 4.1 Abstraction of the Analytical Model
The following procedure has already been outlined in detail in section 2. Commencing with the analytical model in the preceeding section, landmarks for all variables are chosen and constraints about the functions are defined. For the landmarks concerning the resource stock x, recruitment R and harvest h the settings as introduced in section 2 are used. For capital and investment the landmarks k : 0 < k max and I : 0 < I max are defined.
With respect to the marginal variable costs v h , it should be noted that Eq. (13) can be solved for h to yield a harvest supply function h(x, k), for which we chose the landmarks h : 0 < M SY < h max . This function is increasing in both arguments, which can be shown from the premises made for the production function f and the inverted demand function p. Moreover, if the resource is not utilized (h = 0) it holds that x = 0 or k = 0. These properties of h are entailed by a relation called qualitative multiplication (Eq. (16)). When x, k and h are always non-negative, h = M U LT (x, k) implies that
x < 0 andk < 0 ⇒ḣ < 0.
For technical reasons v k is replaced by −v k : 0 < v kmax , which is modeled by a M −− (x, k) constraint, implying that −v k is a monotonically decreasing function in x and in k (cf. Eq. (4)).
Furthermore, the technique of qualitative modeling allows some simplifications of the ODE system (Eq. (14)- (13)), if we assume that c II , r and δ are constant and c I (0) = 0. The latter is justified if changes in investment costs are small for small I. It can be shown that I always has the same sign and qualitative direction as the expression r+δ cII c I (I). Therefore, in the qualitative model this term can be simplified to I. For the same reason δ · k can be replaced by k, and N · h by h. The complete list of the constraints employed in the qualitative model are represented in relational form by Eq. (17) .
Results
In order to compute the set of possible behaviors we made use of the QSIM simulation package which is distributed by the University of Texas at Austin. The package provides a simulation shell which allows all qualitative behaviors to be identified and additionally supplies aid for a systematical analysis of the solution set. Overall the simulation runs provide 198 qualitative states consistent with the model definitions and an even larger number of possible qualitative events between the states. This solution set becomes tractable if we observe that many possible system developments only differ in the behavior of auxiliary variables, like v k . To visualize the results, we focus on the variables stock size, harvest and capital, which are of interest regarding the problem of over-fishing and overcapitalization (socalled focus variables). Considering behaviors which are equal with respect to the focus variables, they can be further aggregated. This results in a more general form of a state-transition-diagram, called a focus graph (Fig. 6) . A vertex (abstract state) is introduced if there exists a class of qualitative states for which the focus variables have the same qualitative value. An edge from a vertex a to b indicates that there exists at least one behavior in the solution set in which a qualitative event shifts the system from a state representing the class a to a state representing the class b. Thus, the solution set is reduced to 19 abstract states, where one A represents a catastrophic equilibrium (see Fig. 6 ) and each of them is consistent with the weak assumptions made above. In particular, Fig. 6 shows that transitions between certain areas of the focus graph (e.g. from quadrant II to quadrant III) are only possible in one direction. This system property has far-reaching consequences for the design of steering mechanisms, because by this some qualitative events can be classified as irreversible events. Our qualitative model is able to trace the typical behavior of commercial fishery in good agreement with real world data. Fig. 7b shows the development of the blue whale fishery in terms of the whale stock and the capital stock over the period 1946-1980. This development consists of an initial phase in which the whale stock declines while the capital stock increases, and a subsequent phase in which the capital stock declines rapidly, whereas the whale stock still declines, but ultimately shows signs of recovery. Figures. 7a and 7c show one behavior of our qualitative model, namely the development path from vertex #1 to #12 of Fig. 6 (dashed-dotted and white arrows) . This behavior traces the observed pattern of the whale stock and the capital stock very well. Whereas several other models (CCM, McKelvey) predict an initial jump of the capital stock, followed by a period in which both the whale stock and the capital stock decline, our model reproduces the observed inverse initial relationship between the capital and the fish stock. This behavior occurs because, as the fish stock declines, investment is intensified in order to offset the rise in variable harvesting costs. In a subsequent phase, however, the effect of the declining fish stock on harvesting costs becomes so strong that it cannot be offset in such a way. In this phase, the capital stock starts to decline drastically, i.e. net investment becomes negative. The decline of the fish stock may be reversed in [25] , and N to the number of firms).
this phase. It may, however, also be that both the capital and the fish stock approaches zero. A discussion of such branching points is provided in section 5.2. The corresponding behavior of the catch is shown in Fig. 7c . It can be seen that the catch initially rises, but starts to decline while the capital stock is still increasing. As an impressive result of the model, this property of overcapitalization can be derived directly from the focus graph (Fig. 6) . Decreasing catches and increasing capital stock occur simultaneously, whenever the system approaches the vertices #3, #6, #8 or #18. If the system starts at vertex #1 (relatively undisturbed stock), there exists no possible path in the focus graph, where one of these vertices is not reached at some time. Thus, overcapitalization in this sense is an unavoidable system property.
Discussion and Policy Implications
Discussing the results in terms of political measures, a variety of conclusions can be drawn, although only a qualitative approach is used to assess the situation in commercial fishery. In the following we will further validate the model by showing that mistakes arising from temporary management measures can also be reconstructed. Commencing from this we will discuss implications and policy actions in the light of the results obtained in more detail.
Why Management Fails
Decisionmakers may respond rather late to an emerging crisis and, in addition, with drastic, temporary interventions. We can analyze even such situations as this with the model developed. Although the system does not follow the dynamics of the model during a period managed in this way, we can compare the qualitative state of the system before and after this timeframe. Two such drastic interventions are represented by the bold arrows in Fig. 6 starting at the dashed vertex and reflect the well-known case of the disaster of the cod fishery in the North Atlantic ocean (Grand Bank and Barents Sea). What happened in these regions?
The situation in the Grand Bank region and in the Barents Sea exhibited similarities, but the results of political interventions in these two cases were quite different. Whereas in the Canadian case the worst consequences ensued, the Norwegians were able to prevent a severe disaster. The two cases are now discussed in more detail.
• The cod fiasco in the Canadian waters at the beginning of the 1970s is an example of an unadopted strategy leading to a severe economic and environmental catastrophe. After a maximum catch of ≈ 1.9 · 10 6 t in 1969, the stock dropped rapidly to ≈ 4.7 · 10 5 t. Facing an ecological disaster in 1977, when the exclusive economic zone was introduced, Canada banned foreign trawlers from the Grand Banks (Fig. 8) . The Canadians implemented catch This area comprises also the Grand Banks east of Newfoundland, which is the location of the so-called cod-war between the European Community and Canada. The dashed line indicates the increase in licensed fishers in Newfoundland. Data from [10, 23] . quotas (TAC), whereby in a controversial discussion between scientists and fishers whether the TACs are too tight or not, fishers often prevailed due to massive political pressure. As a consequence, quotas were only binding for a short period [12] .
Other warning signs, e.g. such as the decline in fish sizes, were neglected [22] . At the same time when the stocks were declining, the government responded with massive subsidies mitigating economic losses and in expectation of increasing gains due to the ban of European trawlers. But this merely led to investment in improved gear and ever more efficient fishkilling [14] . Subsequently, in Newfoundland alone the number of licensed fishers tripled (Fig. 8) .
The impact of this steering regime is represented by the bold black arrow in Fig. 6 . The fish stock was able to slightly recover, but TACs were slackened before they reached the x MSY level. At the same time there was no reduction in fleet capacity. Consequently, the system moved to vertex #13, and traversed an additional path through vertices #10 and #8, which finally led to A . In Canada this was the end of the story, because the cod stock has been fully exploited up to the present day and more than 40,000 jobs were lost in the early 1990s [27] .
• The Norwegians when facing a similar disaster in the Barents Sea cod grounds had learned their lessons at least partially and introduced a more comprehensive policy, e.g. individual transferable quotas which helped to reduce the race for fish. Although there were a lot of bankruptcies in fishery and many demonstrations, the politicians knew that there could be no giving in to protests for short-term political gain. They additionally set up subsidies of about $71 Mio. -against the Canadians -to remove ships from the fishery and to diversify the coastal economy [14] . Finally, they banned fishing from spawning grounds. If these measures are slackened after a time long enough, the system is shifted to vertex #15 (grayish bold arrow in Fig. 6 ) with reduced capacities and recovered cod stock. On the other hand, a new cycle through all quadrants can evolve.
Both examples show a more or less crucial result. Whereas the Canadians have ruined both fish stocks and fishing industry, the Norwegians can lament only a serious decline in their fisheries economy. But a sophisticated look at the Norwegian actions shows that their interventions were only half-hearted, because they paid subsidies for their large trawlers to leave Norwegian waters for other fishing grounds (e.g. New Zealand) [14] , and the Norwegian government is currently discussing a slackening of catch permits. We can conclude from these two cases that temporary measures only suspend the intrinsic problem, i.e. that the serious state #8 may be reached again. Such intrinsic properties are now investigated in more detail.
Critical Branchings and Overcapitalization
As a critical branching in our analysis we consider those vertices in the focus graph where either an edge to a more serious system behavior or an amelioration occurs (Fig. 6 ). Along with irreversible events, the identification of critical points exhibits another advantage of the method used. We assume that we start with a relatively undisturbed stock and an industry on a low level (#1, quadrant I, x > x MSY , h < M SY ) and refer to the trajectory indicated by the dashed-dotted edges. If one starts with fishing activities, the stock is decreasing and both the harvest and the capital stock are increasing. The first irreversible event the system attains goes from vertex #1 to #2 (quadrant II). Here already the crucial situation occurs, that the catch reaches a nonsustainable level (h > M SY ), while the capital stock is still increasing. Focusing on the the next step, the irreversible edge from #2 to #5, harvest is still increasing and is above the sustainable yield, although the resource is facing a continuing degradation (additionally now x < x MSY holds). After this event, a direct reversal to quadrant II is impossible and a more threatening situation is unavoidable (#6, quadrant III). Here we observe a typical situation where the capital stock is further increased in an effort to offset the impact of a dwindling stock on the catch. But as shown by Fig. 6 it is already far too late, because the downward development to #8 is envitable, where the industry and the fish stock are likely to be ruined A . Other possible paths through the focus graph that avoid vertex #8, reach vertex #9 at some time and face the same threat. It should be noticed that reaching vertex #8 or #9 is unavoidable, if the system leaves quadrants I and II (which is, e.g. obviously the case for the North Atlantic cod fishery). At these vertices the collapse of the fishery can be prevented if, due to a rapid comedown of the industry, the stock already recovers (indicated by the white edges, Fig. 6 ). The latter represents the situation which we have observed for the blue whale hunting and which is displayed in Fig. 7b. (cf. section 4) . These different possible outcomes at vertices #8 and #9 qualifies them as critical branchings, which are, moreover, inevitable in the context of the model. Therefore fishery management should take account of this general problem in two ways: (i) How can the likelihood of the system to recover at the critical branchings be strengthened? (ii) How can it be avoided that the fishery comes back to this "bifurcation" after the resource has recovered?
To approach the first question, a detailed analytical investigation of the critical "bifurcation" is needed. It is the qualitative approach that has helped us to identify this important region of the phase space, and it provides a starting point for further investigations. The outcome depends on how early net investment decreases (#8 to #9), and how early the stock recovers (#9 to #11). For the first step the reduction rate of investment and capital stock when the system enters vertex #8 is decisive. The outcome of the second step depends on the fish stock at the entry of vertex #9, its regeneration rate and the speed of harvest reduction. If we compare this with Eq. (12)-(13), several factors can contribute to the decline or recovery of the stock:
• regeneration rate of fish stock
• depreciation of capital stock
• marginal investment costs
• marginal variable costs with respect to capital and harvest A further development of so-called semi-qualitative techniques could help to refine this analysis to more explicit criteria, especially for critical capital and fish stocks at the entry of the vertices #8 and #9.
However, it is the key observation that under the current normative settings the bio-economic system is at perpetual risk, because the critical states #8, #9 and overcapacities cannot be avoided (cf. section 4), due to a situation in which the two peculiarities prosperity and greed operates [30] . This leads to a severe forecast for both the fishery and the natural resources. However, under these conditions it is rather difficult to steer the bio-economic system to both safe economic and ecological units, because under dynamic aspects the system today needs a massive perpetual adjustment. This -under the instantaneous boundary conditions -looks more like a ride along the edge of an abyss than a safe strategy.
Therefore, management should open up additional and less risky development paths that make it possible to avoid overcapacites and critical branchings. To achieve this, the atomistic open-access structure has to be altered and the indolence of capital has to be controlled (slower investment when fish stocks are high, and faster reduction when they are low). This might lead to far-reaching consequences for industrial fishery, e.g. changes in subsidies policy. Additionally, mixed strategies (control of harvest and capacities, as well as variable and investment costs) have to be initiated to improve the likelihood of the system being able to recover at critical branchings.
Conclusion
This paper addresses the serious global problem of industrial open access-fishery and the role of capital accumulation. Systems like this are often intrinsically complex, and understanding of them is limited by low levels of knowledge with respect to both biological and economic properties. Moreover, to keep the models accessible to analysis, previous analytical approaches have relied on a variety of simplifying assumptions with respect to investment costs, harvesting costs, or industry structure.
Here, we have presented a model with relaxed assumptions, which is studied from a hitherto new methodological perspective. We have shown that the usage of qualitative differential equations can improve the reasoning process about the dynamics of the system efficiently, especially in the case of incomplete underlying knowledge. Additionally, our model features increasing marginal investment costs and marginal harvesting costs that are decreasing in both the fish and the capital stock. Thus, fish stock and capital stock are (incomplete) substitutes in the production of catch. The latter set of assumptions has proved to be the key in explaining why capital can keep rising while both the fish stock and the catch decline. The encompassing analysis of the model output shows that all possible model trajectories necessarily undergo such a phase of overcapitalization. It also reveals other inherent, and in the sense of political measures, serious system properties, e.g. irreversible points or critical branchings.
Further work will run along several lines. Policy measures and numerical data (when available) can be incorporated into a qualitative simulation framework. Also a multispecies module, together with more detailed models of decision making in fisheries, could enhance the results.
Summing up, we feel that the results and the applied technique open a promising road towards new insights in the coupled bio-economic systems of open-access fisheries. In addition, by enabling a weak prognosis, they could be helpful for future political advice.
